

Customer Advisory

TOP ISSUES

October 19th, 2016

BOMBARDIER
the evolution of mobility

TOP 20 ISSUES

- CIC WEBSITE PERSONALIZED TO AIRCRAFT
- REFUEL/DEFUEL MANIFOLD LEAKING
- NO BIOCIDE AVAILABLE FOR FUEL TANK IN EU
- NTO 174
- APU EGT PROBES
- PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE RELIABILITY
- PACK INLET TEMP SENSORS RELIABILITY
- PACK DISCHARGE TEMP SENSORS RELIABILITY
- NOSE WHEEL STEERING ACTUATOR RELIABILITY
- BCU & BCV RELIABILITY
- CABLE TENSION
- ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
- INBOARD FLAP CORROSION
- VERTICAL STABILIZER SKIN CORROSION
- MAGAIR TOILET SYSTEM SUPPORT AND RELIABILITY
- WATER SYSTEM DRAIN VALVE FAILURE
- BATCH 3.3 IMPROVEMENTS
- NAV TO NAV TRANSFER ISSUES
- G6000 – RC V4.5 SELECTED SPEED HOLD
- VISION – SVS FAIL POSTING

00-23-G-787

TOP ISSUE

NEW CUSTOMER PORTAL

- Complete redesign
- Enhanced online offering
- Customer Support Processes Enablement
- Multi-device interface (Mobile and Desktop)
- Enhanced document search experience
- Information relevant to your fleet



Current Activities:

Using an Agile approach to accomplish key activities

- Design of back end systems complete, development is underway.
- Blueprint of the Online Parts Ordering solution enhancements
- Planning and developing website content cleansing and creation.

Website evolution is part of a much broader initiative to enhance our on-line customer experience

DATE RAISED	RAISED BY	ACTION BY
APR 11	T. NOONAN	M. ELBAZ

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00-23-G-787

TOP ISSUE

PORTAL FUNCTIONALITIES – WHAT IS CHANGING?

Functionality	CIC	New Portal
Portal documents filtered against fleet		✓
Portal content filtered against fleet		✓
Mobile friendly		✓
Notification subscription/management		✓
Customer chosen user id & password		✓
Parts Price and Availability	✓	✓
Online Parts Ordering	✓	✓
Single Sign-on (Parts Ordering & Manuals)	✓	✓
Smart Parts monthly utilization reporting	✓	✓
Online MRA & Warranty Claim	✓	✓
Enhanced document search	✓	✓

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APR 11	T. NOONAN	M. ELBAZ

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REFUEL/DEFUEL MANIFOLD CRACKING

Several minutes after refueling, noticed a fuel leak coming from the refuel/defuel manifold. Closer inspection of the manifold showed a crack between the center and left control valve.

- 7 events have been reported (Last event: Dec/13)

✓ Root cause analysis finalized (Aug/15)

- Single burst event due to fuel trapped in the manifold, aft tank lines, defuel lines and the adaptor to manifold line. Thermal expansion of the fuel can result in pressure surpassing the manifold's burst pressure.

✓ Refueling and Defueling AMM procedures revised (12-11-01-650-801, 12-11-05-650-801 & 12-11-03-650-801):

✓ Opening the center refuel/defuel valve to ensure the residual pressure in the tube/manifold is released after the fuel nozzle is disconnected from the refuel adaptor. (Will be included in May 4th, 2016 AMM revision). Ref.: advance copy.

28-26-M-861

TOP
ISSUE

REFUEL/DEFUEL MANIFOLD CRACKING



BOMBARDIER GLOBAL
BD-700 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE MANUAL – PART II

(d) Install the cap on the refuel/defuel adapter.

NOTE: It is recommended to obey the instructions that follow to make sure to relieve any residual pressure that can build up in the manifold due to thermal expansion.
- Set the MANUAL/AUTO switch to the MANUAL/REFUEL position.
- Set the MANUAL CTR tank switch to OPEN position.
- Set the MANUAL CTR tank switch to CLOSE position.
- Set the MANUAL/AUTO switch to the OFF position.

Subtask 12-11-03-866-001

(35) Do the wet motor of the engine (TASK 71-00-00-866-805).

E. Close Out

Subtask 12-11-03-942-001

(1) Remove all tools, equipment, and unwanted materials from the work area.

Subtask 12-11-03-863-002

(2) In the flight compartment, on the EMS CDU, set the circuit breakers that follow to IN (TASK 24-00-00-863-802):

SYSTEM NAME	CIRCUIT BREAKER NAME	BUS NAME
ENGINE	L ENG FUEL HPSOV	BATT
ENGINE	R ENG FUEL HPSOV	BATT
FUEL	L CTR XFER PUMP	AC 1
FUEL	R CTR XFER PUMP	AC 4

Subtask 12-11-03-410-001

(3) Close the REFUEL/DEFUEL PANEL access door (142AR).

Subtask 12-11-03-861-002

(4) Remove electrical power from the aircraft (TASK 24-00-00-861-802).

EFFECTIVITY: ALL

12-11-03 Page 314

ADVANCE COPY

(d) Install the cap on the refuel/defuel adapter.

NOTE: It is recommended to obey the instructions that follow to make sure to relieve any residual pressure that can build up in the manifold due to thermal expansion.
- Set the MANUAL/AUTO switch to the MANUAL/REFUEL position.
- Set the MANUAL CTR tank switch to OPEN position.
- Set the MANUAL CTR tank switch to CLOSE position.
- Set the MANUAL/AUTO switch to the OFF position.

ADVANCE COPY

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28-29-M-912

TOP ISSUE

REFUEL/DEFUEL MANIFOLD LEAKING

Please address the Refuel/Defuel Manifold O-Rings Leaking Issue.

+ 3 in Oct!

- 12 events reported (Last event: Nov/2015)
  - 9 events occurred on XRS models, 1 on the Global 6000 and 2 on the Global 5000

✓ Root cause finalized (Jan/2016)
- Tube movement during the opening and closing of the Refuel/Defuel valves.
- The tube design is different on the Global XRS/6000 when compared to the Global Express/5000. This difference contributes to the failure mode.



In-Service improvement:

Introduction of alternate "fuel resistant" lubricant (EZ-Turn per AMS-G-6032) for the installation of the Refuel/Defuel tube to offer better durability compared to the current soluble in fuel lubricant (Petrolatum VV-P-236).

✓ Alternate lubricant testing completed (Apr/2016):
- ✓ Implementation of new lubricant via AMM: July 29th, 2016
- ✓ Production cut-in of new lubricant on aircraft s/n 9783 & subs

DATE RAISED **APR 14** → RAISED BY **A.WILKINSON** → ACTION BY **D. FIELD**

BOMBARDIER the evolution of mobility

28-33-M-973

TOP ISSUE

NO BIOCIDE AVAILABLE FOR FUEL TANK IN EU

Biobor JF, Biocide additive to be used for Biocidal treatment of the fuel tanks (AMM tasks 12-11-01-620-801 and 28-10-00-620-801) Bombardier consumable reference 11-001 is not available for sale within the EU as per the Biocidal products regulation.

Investigation Status:

- Biobor JF:
  - Confirmed Biobor JF is currently not registered under the EU Biocidal registry, therefore not allowed for resale/distribution in the EU countries.
- Kathon FP 1.5:
  - Alternate biocide used in the industry which is on the EU Biocidal registry.
    - ✓ Rolls Royce and Honeywell (APU) have Kathon FP 1.5 as an approved additive
    - Parker do not have Kathon FP 1.5 approved on the Global and would require qualification testing.

Next Step:

- Work with Parker on the work scope and cost of the Kathon FP 1.5 approval

DATE RAISED **APR 16** → RAISED BY **A. WALKER** → ACTION BY **D. FIELD**

BOMBARDIER the evolution of mobility

NTO 174

Implementation:

- Retrofit to be incorporated at the BBA Service Centers.
  - No costs to Operators
  - Software updated on-site
  - EEC must be removed to update the main unit label.



- Five (5) rigs will be made available to cover the following locations:
  - 1- Montreal (GCC) then Mobile Repair Team (MRT)
  - 2- Americas
  - 1- Europe, Middle-East & Africa (EMEA)
  - 1- Asia

DATE RAISED	RAISED BY	ACTION BY
OCT 12	BOMBARDIER	D. Field

73-26-M-870

TOP ISSUE

NTO 174

No response to the throttle setting involving one or both engines or an aircraft after on-ground engine start/taxi. The EEC limits engine power to idle when both EEC Channels are at Health Level 2 or worse. Normal engine behavior after engine restart (EEC reset).

Solution : EEC Software change (X2.0)
Will eliminate the requirement for EEC reset procedure.

- ✓ Service Bulletin and related documentation released Oct 4th, 2016

Service Bulletins	Ref number
Modification- Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) System – EEC Software Upgrade of Version X2.0	- 700-73-009 - Global Express/XRS. - 700-1A11-73-005 - Global 5000. - 700-73-5002 - Global 5000 feat. Vision flight deck. - 700-73-6002 - Global 6000.
Advisory Wire / NTO	**Ref number**
Engine power pull-back to idle during ground operation. Reset of the EEC System prior to every engine start	- AW700-73-0378 rev 5 - NTO 174 Issue No. 08
AFM/FCOM TR	**Ref number**
Temporary revision to remove the step to reset the FADEC.	- TR 155 - TR 115

73-26-M-870

TOP ISSUE

NTO 174

In-Service Implementation:

Retrofit to be incorporated at the Bombardier Service Centers (BAS):

- No costs to the Operators
- Scheduled campaign managed by BBA In-Service Implementation Team (ISIT).
- Service Bulletin is applicable to all aircraft but only the following EEC P/N require the X2.0 Software upgrade:
  - EECU1000-01AA
  - EECU1000-01AB
  - EECU1000-01AC
- EEC must be removed to perform the S/W upload and to replace the main unit label.
- The estimated downtime required to perform the S/W upload : 7 hours (per A/C)
- Five (5) dedicated rigs will be made available at Bombardier BAS facilities / MRT:
  - Based on the demand, the rigs locations will be changed during the campaign

APU EGT Probe (49-28-M-908)

- Issue:
  - The new improved EGT probes via RIMP seems to be failing more frequently than the old EGT probes.
- Root Cause Analysis:
  - Moisture causes a conductive path from the thermocouple circuit to the EGT probe chassis creating a condition where the ECU detects and annunciates a short to ground (STG) fault
- Corrective Action:
  - VSB RE220-49-8169 released June 2015 (RTV solution)
    - Compliance on Aircraft prior to delivery from A/C 9691
    - RTV application intent incorporated in Bombardier AMM EGT probes installation task (49-61-05-400-801) Released August 29th, 2014.
  - Additional Points
    - When installing a new EGT probe, it should be noted that the baking process is not required
    - Reduced probe pricing maintained through Fix Effectiveness Evaluation

Honeywell

APU EGT Probe (49-28-M-908)

- Next Steps:
  - Fix Effectiveness Determination
    - Further evaluation of VSB RE220-49-8169, in accordance while we are still in the 12 month evaluation period:

Activity	Purpose	Status	Completion

Feedback from Operators	Receive first hand accounts and feedback on performance of RTV fix and potential solutions	• Alternative baking procedures have been suggested and are under evaluation
		• Add Probe Analysis:
		  • 2015 – 3 units
		  • 2016 – 4 units
			On-Going

Application in Shop Environment	Determine if RTV application in a controlled environment impacts field performance	• 29 APUs have had the RTV applied via VSB applied at Phx R&O	December 2016
Installation Effects	Review any differences between other installation on the RE220 on other applications	• CRJ: Determined that due to the differing operational environment, the installation are not comparable	October 2016

  - Honeywell will continue efforts to collect relative data over the next three months
    - Based on data collected will determine if alternate options are required.

Honeywell

PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE RELIABILITY

Excessive removals are reported in operation for PRSOV P/N GG436-1055-1 Amdt A



LIEBHERR

PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE RELIABILITY

Investigations performed:

- ✓ **In-service data deep dive analysis completed**.
  - PRSOV shop finding analysis highlight sub-assemblies failure trend.
- ✓ **Extensive system analysis completed:**
  - APU BLEED DISABLE CAS message at power up
  - Full functional analysis: review of pressure, temperature, internal flow and leakages.
  - Duty cycle analysis to find the configuration emphasizing contamination ingress
- ✓ **9 x PRSOV detailed teardowns performed** to confirm the potential failure contributors (Bombardier's participation on-site at LTS for 2 of these teardowns).
  - Factual findings identified on a representative PRSOV sample size.
  - Correlation of teardown with in-service shop findings
- ✓ **Detailed equipment and sub-assemblies analysis** completed:
  - Thermal impact addressed by a dedicated test.
  - Laboratory analysis of microswitch and ball bearings
  - Laboratory analysis of contamination nature

LTS and BA performed a full analysis of all potential contributors, which allowed to identify and confirm the root causes

LIEBHERR

PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE RELIABILITY

Root causes identified:

- ✓ Contamination of PRSOV: APU Bleed ON with aircraft on ground:
  - APU bleed operation on ground with PRSOV in its CLOSED position is causing atmospheric contamination to enter the valve.
- ✓ Butterfly Ball bearing corrosion:
  - Following engine shut-down after landing phase, moisture enhances the corrosion of the bearings' material.
- ✓ Microswitch cell integration:
  - The microswitch cell drifts in a position resulting in PRSOV position monitoring failure.
- ✓ High NFF rate and their link with "APU BLEED DISABLE CAS message" is confirmed:
  - No identified returned case since AFM/FCOM/QRH procedure change was published.

The completion of the root cause analysis at the end of September opened the road to the definition of efficient solutions to improve the PRSOV reliability

LIEBHERR

PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE RELIABILITY

Already in place:

- The terminating check procedure change implemented in AFM/FCOM/QRH (May 4th, 2016) will be maintained as it directly addresses one of the root causes

Next steps and way forward:

- Identification of the candidate solutions to address the root causes: ECD Nov/2016
- Feasibility assessment and quantification of reliability benefits: ECD Nov/2016
- Solution selection & definition of the implementation plan: ECD Q1/2017

LTS will have a plan to deploy effective solutions by end of Q1 2017

LIEBHERR

PACK INLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR RELIABILITY

PACK FAULT CAS Message. Lots of PITS sensor removals, P/N GG436-2005-3.

Same component part number (GG436-2005-3) used in different locations:

Pack Inlet Temp Sensors (PITS)



Compressor Discharge Temp Sensors (CDTS)



Humidifier Boiler Temp Sensor



~ 80% of GG436-2005-3 removals are PITS related.

LIEBHERR

PACK DISCHARGE TEMPERATURE SENSOR RELIABILITY

PACK FAULT CAS Message. Lots of PDTS sensor removals, P/N: GG436-2015-3.

Same component part number (GG436-2015-3) used in different locations.

Pack Discharge Temp Sensor (PDTS)



Pack Temp Sensor (PTS)



Mix Manifold Temp Sensor (MMTS)



Duct Temp Sensor (DTS)



~ 99% of GG436-2015-3 removals are PDTS related.

LIEBHERR

NOSE WHEEL STEERING ACTUATOR RELIABILITY

Reliability of Steering Actuators P/N 1287A0000-02 (LH) and P/N 1288A0000-02 (RH).

58 NWS Actuators removed since last Advisory (Sept 2015 to Feb 2016)

NOSE STEER FAIL CAS message and LVDT feedback fail OMS/CAIMS



- Moisture ingress resulting in corrosion
  - Application of sealant on LVDT crimped area of the conduit to prevent moisture ingress
    - ✓ Leak test and hydraulic fluid soak test completed
    - ✓ Environmental testing completed
    - ✓ BBA Service Bulletin:
      - o SB700-32-038; SB700-32-1A11-025; SB700-32-5014; SB700-32-6014 (Released : Mar/16)

LEAKAGE - Cylinder gland nut seal leakage

- Testing of several seal types were unsuccessful.
- A new solution is in discussion.

NOSE WHEEL STEERING ACTUATOR RELIABILITY

Reliability of Steering Actuators P/N 1287A0000-02 (LH) and P/N 1288A0000-02 (RH).

NOSE STEER FAIL CAS message and LVDT feedback fail OMS/CAIMS

- Moisture ingress resulting in corrosion
  - Short term solution:
    - Application of sealant on LVDT crimped area of the conduit to prevent moisture ingress
      - ✓ BBA Service Bulletin: (Released: Mar/2016)
        - SB700-32-038; SB700-32-1A11-025; SB700-32-6014; SB700-32-5014



  - Long Term solution:
    - New conduit is under testing.
    - LVDT assembly design improvement in-work with the supplier.

TOP ISSUE

BRAKE CONTROL UNIT & BRAKE CONTROL VALVE RELIABILITY

Need to investigate the reliability of the Brake Control Unit (BCU) and the Brake Control Valve (BCV).

Main BCU/BCV removal reasons:

- « 50% BRAKE DEGRADED» CAS messages
- « BRAKE FAULT» CAS messages

Root cause:

Sudden pressure variation in the brake system degrades the BCV and results in fault annunciation.

Solutions:

Alternate Shut-off Valve (SOV) being tested at vendor facility to reduce the transient pressure spike in the system.

- Aircraft level validation required to confirm results observed at vendor's facility.

DATE RAISED **SEP 13** → RAISED BY **BOMBARDIER** → ACTION BY **D. FIELD**

27-33-M-983

TOP ISSUE

CABLE TENSION

Aileron and Rudder control cables tension were addressed via AD (TLMC). BBA to investigate other cables.

Aileron Cables runs:

Flight Compartment portion:
- Task 27-11-35-720-801
- Non tension regulated
- TLMC 5-10-40: CMR task 30M
- AD CF-2016-06 released Feb 26th, 2016

Fuselage portion:
- Task: 27-11-35-720-802
- Non tension regulated
- TLMC 5-10-40: CMR task 30M
- AD CF-2016-06 released Feb 26th, 2016

Wings portion:
- Task: 27-11-35-720-803
- Tension regulated
- TLMC 5-21-10: MRB task 60M
- Released: July 29th, 2016

Rudder run:

Cockpit, Fuselage & Rear Bay portion:
- Task 27-21-27-720-801
- Non tension regulated
- TLMC 5-10-40: CMR task 30M
- AD CF-2016-06 released Feb 26th, 2016

Elevator run

- Task: 27-31-35-720-801
- Tension regulated
- TLMC 5-21-10: MRB task 60M
- Released July 29th, 2016

27-33-M-983

TOP ISSUE

CABLE TENSION

Other Global Flight Control Cables:

- Aileron autopilot−servo cables:
  - TASK 27−10−00−220−801 (TLMC 5−21−10: 60M interval) Detailed Inspection of the Aileron Control Cables in the Main Landing Gear (MLG) Wheel Well and Mid Wing−to−Fuselage Fairing
- Elevator autopilot−servo cables.
  - TASK 27−30-00-220-801 (TLMC 5−21−10: 60M interval) Detailed Inspection of the Elevator Control Cables in the Vertical Stabilizer − (Front Spar to Rear Spar)

Note: The procedures include the detailed inspection and tension check of the servo cables.

TOP ISSUE

CABLE TENSION

Other Cables:

- Passenger Door (PAX) :
  - Cable relaxation have no impact on the Passenger Door (PAX) operation.
  - The mechanism with its tensator assembly acts like a cable tension regulator.

- Emergency Gear Release cable
  - Cable relaxation has no impact on the gear emergency release system.
  - Landing gear emergency release system was tested with the cable at 0 lb tension. The opening sequence was successfully accomplished within 70% of handle's travel.

DATE RAISED	RAISED BY	ACTION BY
APR 16	COMMITTEE	D. FIELD

TOP ISSUE

57-33-M-975

INBOARD FLAP CORROSION

L/H & R/H inboard flaps outboard castings found corroded around four nutplates on each flap. After opening the skin we encountered corrosion on all castings. Due to the fact that there is zero tolerance we have been forced to replace all parts. Parts availability is a concern.

Current Status

- 10 Global operators have reported corrosion on either the L/H and/or R/H Inner Flap ribs during incorporation of SB 700-57-048.
- The reported corrosion varies from light surface to severe degree.
- 7 aircraft have replaced one or more ribs.

Suspected root causes:

- Water ingress.
- Insufficient water drainage.
- Unprotected material at the electrical bonding surface area (inboard rib).

TOP ISSUE

57-33-M-975

INBOARD FLAP CORROSION

In-Service protection improvements:

A) Corrosion resistance and drainage improvement, no skin removal is required:

- Drain hole in lower skin and in “P” Seal.
- Drain path inboard side of leading edge.
- Corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC) application via drain holes.
- Maintain clearance between rear spar and trailing edge.

B) Improvements if removal of skin is required:

- Includes in-service protection improvements listed above.
- Introduction of silver plated nut plate shells (dome nuts).
- Sealant around & on top of nut plate shells.
- Ramp of sealant.



Both improvements available via Modsum IS700-57-0008

TOP ISSUE

55-31-M-960

VERTICAL STABILIZER SKIN CORROSION

While performing 15 year inspection , Task 55-30-00-208, corrosion was found on the upper vertical stabilizer skins. Corrosion was 50% of skin thickness in several places. Replacing the skins will be costly. Submitting this as a new issue to determine whether this corrosion affects the entire Global fleet.



Identified root causes

- Moisture ingress and environmental contamination
- Rivetless nutplate material

Solution status:

- Proof of concept for improvements (Next A/C available)
  - Drainage for lower and upper section
  - Corrosion Inhibiting Compound (CIC) application at sensitive locations.
  - Rivetless nutplate replacement with cadmium plated ones.
- Drainage and CIC solution are available via SRPSA

Proposed Inspection and Task revision

- Introduction of a new detailed inspection.
- Task threshold and repetitive interval at 60 months.
  - To be presented to the fall ISC meeting.

DATE RAISED **APR 15** → RAISED BY **B.SNYDER** → ACTION BY **D. FIELD**

BOMBARDIER the evolution of mobility

TOP ISSUE

38-29-M-926

MAGAIR TOILET SYSTEM SUPPORT AND RELIABILITY

Monogram toilet PN: 15730-001 (Effectivity 9002 – 9153)

Bombardier is working on two(2) strategies in parallel:

1**) Magair to E-vac toilet conversion**

- A design proposal has been made available to modify the aircraft's toilet system from a Magair to an E-vac system.
  - Bombardier was seeking an engagement of 10 Operators
  - AW700-38-0537 released Jan 12th, 2016

Project will not be pursued due to an absence of demand



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TOP ISSUE

38-29-M-926

MAGAIR TOILET SYSTEM SUPPORT AND RELIABILITY

2) Magair reliability improvement

Introduction of a troubleshooting guide based on toilet fault codes

- Supplier repair process
- Filter location
- Addition of filters
  - Line filter
  - Transfer tank (mesh filter)

Additional Line Filter



Elbow with strainer

- Field Evaluation:
  - Modified toilet field testing (Includes the additional filter and strainers)
    - All test units aircraft installation completed (Aug/2016).
    - Trial period: 6 months

TOP ISSUE

38-32-M-966

WATER SYSTEM DRAIN VALVE FAILURE

The water system will not operate when drain valve fails which includes purging, draining and servicing. Unable to manually drain/purge the system to allow removal and installation of a serviceable valve especially in freezing conditions. Access to the valve requires maintenance personnel. In addition, few in-service reports of un-commanded purge in-flight.

Potable Water System Operation/Evaluation

On wing testing for water entrapment and means of expulsion

- ✓ Forward or Aft drain valves failure:
  - 80% of water in system lines drained through drain masts by gravity
  - 20 % of water trapped can be drained with air pressure applied from PWTU outlet line to the water tank return line to empty water lines
- ✓ Tank drain valves failure:
  - 90% of water in system lines drained through drain masts by gravity
  - Remaining water trapped in system (lines and tank) drained with air pressure applied from water tank return line to the PTWU inlet line.
  - Pumps selector valve must be manually open

TOP ISSUE

WATER SYSTEM DRAIN VALVE FAILURE

Water Expulsion



- Water system draining procedure and optional equipment:
  - Reference Instruction Letter (RIL) GX-0163 published on CIC (Oct/2016).

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WATER SYSTEM PURGE IN-FLIGHT

System Analysis

- System drain can be caused by:
  - Hard failure of a drain valve (System and/or Line Drain).
- Defective UV Filter (Line Drain)
  - System override by the Galley touchscreen
    - Selection of multiple override will empty the system
    - Mechanical By-Pass

Actions:

- Reference Information Letter (RIL) GX-0155 published (CIC Website)
  - Guidance for Sterilizer Override and Bypass Switch Modes
- Forum News Article published and available on CIC Website (Sept 13th ,2016)
  - Potable Water System Shutdown by WTU
  - Multiple override consequences
  - Sterilizer bypass switch option



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TOP ISSUE

BATCH 3.3 IMPROVEMENTS

Provide status for IAC software upgrade Batch 3.3 Service Bulletin (SB)

The scope was expended from four (4) regulatory commitments to include additional changes:

- 63 FMS related in-service issues
- Enable EGPWS Mode 5 alert during LPV approaches
- Past Advisory action 34-29-M-932; FMS Performance Discrepancy, may display incorrect distance, time and fuel to a waypoint or destination during flight

Recommended Batch 3.3 SB 700-31-034 / 700-1A11-31-017, Free of Charge (FOC) for aircraft post Batch 3

✓ Initial version released Jul/16 and revision 1, released Sept/16

AW700-31-0563 Rev.1 – Availability of the Batch 3.3 Software Upgrade

✓ Released Sept/16

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